Vote Buying and Corporate Law by Clark, Robert Charles
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 29 | Issue 4
1979
Vote Buying and Corporate Law
Robert Charles Clark
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Robert Charles Clark, Vote Buying and Corporate Law, 29 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 776 (1979)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol29/iss4/4
Vote Buying and Corporate Law
Robert Charles Clark*
In this article, Professor Clark delineates the majorfunctions ofshareholder vot-
ing rights, analyzes the benits and dangers which may attend shfis in votingpower,
and assesses various ways that legal rules can magnify or regulate these benefits and
dangers He concludes that the purchase 0/proxies should be permitted unless an
objector can prove (1) that it will, in the particular case, present substantial danger
that the corporation or some ofits shareholders will be treated unfairly and (2) that
any increase in the corporation's value which may resultfrom the vote buying will not
outweigh the dangers presented
INTRODUCTION
WELLINGTON ROLLS,' president of Creative Mutual Fund,
is fuming over the refusal of Sleepy Company's management
to arrange an acquisition of Sleepy by a larger company.2 Rolls
believes that several potential suitors are available who would pay
up to $60 per share for a majority interest in Sleepy. Sleepy stock
is trading at $30. The company is publicly held. Creative Mutual
(the Fund) owns three percent of Sleepy's stock, and there are no
dominant shareholders. Rolls does not want the Fund itself to
attempt a takeover of Sleepy because to do so would jeopardize
the Fund's status under the Investment Company Act and the In-
ternal Revenue Code.3 Furthermore, Rolls believes that no poten-
tial acquirer would be willing to conduct an unfriendly takeover
because of the stringent requirements of state anti-takeover stat-
* Professor of Law, Harvard University; B.A. (1966), Maryknoll Seminary; Ph.D.
(1971), Columbia University, J.D. (1972), Harvard University.
1. For a characterological portrait of Rolls, see J. OSBORN, THE ASSOCIATEs (1979).
2. The incident described in the text occurs after Rolls leaves his law firm to head
one of the firm's clients.
3. See Investment Company Act of 1940 (Company Act), §§ 5(b)(1), 13 (a)(l), 15
U.S.C. §§ 80a-5(b)(l), -13(a)(1) (1976); I.R.C. §§ 851(b)(4), 852. An acquisition by the
Fund of a majority interest in Sleepy might require a vote by the Fund's shareholders and
might also cause the Fund to lose its eligibility for the conduit-type income tax treatment
given "regulated investment companies." Id. § 852. In order to receive this tax treatment,
the Fund cannot invest more than 5% of its assets in a single issuer, nor can it own more
than 10% of a single issuer's outstanding voting stock. Company Act, § 5(b)(l), 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-5(b)(l); I.R.C. § 851(b)(4). To exceed these limits requires a vote of the Fund's
shareholders. Company Act, § 13(a)(l), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-13(a)(1). Whether the Fund
would have to jeopardize its eligibility for conduit-type tax treatment in order to acquire up
to 10% of Sleepy's stock depends on the size of the Fund's assets. A huge mutual fund
might be able to take over a small company without using more than 5% of its assets.
1979] VOTE BUYING 777
utes.4 Thus, he would like to solicit enough proxies to elect a new
slate of Sleepy directors at the next annual shareholders' meeting.
The new directors would immediately arrange an acquisition.
Rolls is willing to make all disclosures and filings which may be
required by any federal5 or state6 securities law. He is, however,
worried that a simple proxy solicitation either will not succeed or
will not be worth the expense if successful.7 He therefore wants to
sweeten the deal by offering a cash payment of $1 per share, paya-
ble after the next annual meeting,' to any shareholders who give
proxies to the Fund. He anticipates that this incentive would lead
many shareholders to read their proxy materials and to give the
Fund their proxy; some might even give a proxy without doing
any investigation at all.
Is Rolls' plan prohibited by federal9 and state' ° corporate law?
4. See generally Note, Securities Law and the Constitution: State Tender Offer Stat-
utes Reconsidered, 88 YALE L.J. 510, 514 in. 28 & 29 (1979) (citing 36 statutes and outlin-
ing their substantive and disclosure requirements designed to protect shareholders of target
companies). The battle over the validity of these statutes has not yet been definitively
resolved.
5. E.g., SEC Proxy Solicitation Regulations, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a (1978).
6. E.g., OHIO Rav. CODE ANN. § 1797.041 (Page 1978); 70 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN.
§ 71-85 (Purdon Supp. 1978).
7. If insurgents try to win a proxy contest solely by argument and persuasion, the
costs of carrying on the argument long enough and elaborately enough to prevail may
exceed the gain the insurgents hope to achieve, especially if each item in the propaganda
war must be mailed to a very large number of shareholders. Machtinger, Proxy Fight Ex-
penditures of Insurgent Shareholders, 19 CASE W. REs. L. RaV. 212, 213 (1968). See E.
ARANOW & H. EINHORN, PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 12 (2d ed. 1968).
8. Payment would be made after the meeting because shareholders may be able to
revoke the proxies given to the Fund at any time before they are exercised. See Roberts v.
Whitson, 188 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) (mutual promises held to be insufficient
consideration to make pooling arrangement irrevocable).
Additionally, Rolls will want to provide in the offer that if more than the number of
proxies needed for control are submitted, the Fund will buy some from all submitting
shareholders on a pro rata basis.
To see how Rolls' plan could be effective, assume that Sleepy has 10 million shares
outstanding, and 500,000 shareholders. Since the Fund already owns 3% of the shares, or
300,000 shares, it needs to obtain proxies for an additional 4,701,000 shares to obtain con-
trol At $1 per share, it will spend only $4,701,000 on sweetening the deal, plus an addi-
tional amount, perhaps $500,000, on preparing and mailing the solicitation. The total of
these amounts, $5,201,000, is still far less than the gain that the Fund expects if the merger
is approved, which would be 300,000 shares at $30 per share, or $9 million. Depending on
how confident the Fund feels about successfully arranging such a merger, its contest ex-
penditures might be significantly greater than those postulated.
9. No federal statute expressly forbids such conduct.
10. Some statutes explicitly forbid shareholders from selling their votes or exchanging
their proxies for money or "anything of value." Eg., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 609(e) (Mc-
Kinney 1978). Courts have sometimes refused to enforce voting agreements on the ground
that they constituted impermissible vote selling. Eg., Macht v. Merchants Mortgage &
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Should it be? Rolls wants to buy shareholder votes. His motives
are pure: he wants to gain temporary control of Sleepy Company
in order to cause it to do something that will greatly increase the
company's value to all shareholders, including those who sell their
votes. But doesn't the plan have a bad odor? In the political con-
text, society views explicit vote buying as illegal and immoral. In
the corporate world, on the other hand, one who buys common
shares of a company is in fact purchasing not only a residual eco-
nomic interest in the company, but also a share of the voting
power. And, in hard-fought proxy contests, the rivals may "pay
off" shareholders by wining, dining, and entertaining them," in
the hope that such activities will enable shareholders to think
more sensibly about the issues and persons involved in the strug-
gle. But even in the corporate context, pure vote buying-where
payment is in cash and nothing but votes are bought-may strike
the observer as deeply suspect. Are such feelings mere phantasms
of minds trained to revere traditional democratic ideals and prac-
tices, or do they have substance?
The corporate lawyer may object that this hypothetical is odd,
since it rarely makes economic sense for a person to purchase vot-
ing control without also buying a greater economic interest in the
company, and that, therefore, we need not consider how the law
should treat pure corporate vote buying. The point, however, is
that the process of trying to produce a clear, rational answer to the
pure case may help us to develop and organize our thoughts about
the issues involved in the myriad, real world transactions in which
corporate voting power is shifted. Such an analysis may enable us
to anticipate the benefits and dangers created by transfers of vot-
ing power in the most common transactional patterns and to as-
sess the different ways in which legal rules can magnify the
benefits and limit the dangers.
Before analyzing the arguments for legitimating, rejecting, or
Credit Co., 22 Del. Ch. 74, 194 A. 19 (1937) (deposit of preferred stock to be voted with
regard to appointment of directors); Brady v. Bean, 221 Ill. App. 279 (1921) (agreement by
shareholder to vote in favor of sale of corporation's assets in exchange for fraction of pro-
ceeds which creditor would receive from the sale); Stott v. Stott, 258 Mich. 547, 242 N.W.
747 (1932) (agreement by shareholder to vote in favor of corporate loan in exchange for
cancellation of personal debt). Several of the decisions, such as brady, seem to be based in
part on the perception of a serious conflict of interest.
11. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 176-79,
128 N.E.2d 291, 295-96, 148 N.Y.S. 168, 176-79, rehearing denied, 309 N.Y. 807, 130
N.E.2d 610 (1955) (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting) (campaign to "persuade and cajole" by
paying expenses of entertainment, chartered airplanes and limousines, public relations
counsel, and proxy solicitors).
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regulating the major forms of vote buying, we should first achieve
an understanding of the real functions of shareholder voting
rights. This can best be done by examining the basic economic
problems that afflict any system of shareholder democracy in an
advanced economy and the legal devices that have evolved to mit-
igate these problems. Part I of this article discusses these
problems and partial solutions to them. Part II focuses more di-
rectly on the proper legal rules to govern vote buying.
I. PRELUDE: ECONOMIC OBSTACLES TO EFFECTIVE
SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY AND THE LEGAL
PALLIATIVES
Whenever shareholders of a publicly held company vote upon
matters affecting the corporation, they engage in a collective ac-
tion that suffers from many systemic difficulties.12 Such difficul-
ties include "rational apathy" of shareholders, 13 the temptation of
individual shareholders to take a "free ride," 14 and unfairness to
certain shareholders 15 even where collective action is successful.
Since these three problems are distinct, one should not assume
that the same legal inventions will help to solve all of them.
A. The Jational Apathy Situation
Often the aggregate cost to shareholders of informing them-
selves of potential corporate actions, independently assessing the
wisdom of such actions, and casting their votes will greatly exceed
the expected or actual benefits garnered from informed voting.
Recognition of this phenomenon undoubtedly accounts for sev-
eral existing legal rules that generally entrust corporate manage-
ment or the board of directors with all ordinary business decisions
without shareholder participation. 16 But the same problem still
12. Seegeneral, K. ARRow, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDMDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963);
D. BLACK, THE THEORY OF COMMITTEES AND ELECTIONS (1958); J. BUCHANAN & G.
TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962); A. DowNs, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF
DEMOCRACY (1957); A. HIRSCHMAN, Exrr, VOICE AND LOYALTY (1970); M. OLSON, JR.,
THE LoGmC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (2d ed. 1971). Of these works, those by Hirschman
and Olson are the most pertinent to the issues discussed in this article.
13. See A. DOwNS, supra note 12, at 265.
14. See M. OLSEN, JR., supra note 12, at 35.
15. See id. at 20-21.
16. The Model Business Corporation Act, which has been influential in the drafting of
corporation statutes in 35 states, provides that the business and affairs of a corporation
shall be "managed under the direction of' a board of directors. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus.
CORP. ACT (MBCA) § 35. The traditional formulation was simply that the business and
affairs of every corporation should be "managed" by a board of directors. Id.
1979]
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exists with respect to the major subjects of shareholder vot-
ing-the election of directors and the approval or rejection of ma-
jor organic changes such as mergers and liquidations."
Consider a simplified case. Corporation X, with one million
voting common shares outstanding, has ten thousand sharehold-
ers, each of whom owns one block of one hundred shares. The
directors propose a plan to merge X into Corporation Y, which
would result in the acquisition by the former X shareholders, in
exchange for their X shares, of voting common shares in Y with a
total market value of $50 million. In fact, Y would be willing to
exchange $60 million worth of its shares if it had not agreed,
under prodding by X's management and in return for its coopera-
tion in recommending the merger, to give extraordinary salary in-
creases to those officers of X who would continue their
employment after the merger. Payments would also be made to
departing X officers under so-called consulting and noncompeti-
tion agreements. Moreover, a majority of X's directors are not
officers and would seek a new merger agreement at a much higher
price if the current proposal were not approved by the sharehold-
ers.
Assume that all of this information is contained in a 240-page
proxy statement that is sent to X's shareholders and that any ra-
tional shareholder who reads it would decide against the merger.
Assume further that if the merger proposal were disapproved, a
new one would be adopted which would yield Xs shareholders
the additional $10 million gain which Corporation Y was pre-
pared to pay. Thus, the actual benefit to be derived from collec-
tive shareholder action against the merger plan would be $1,000
per shareholder. Shareholders do not expect, however, to discover
a reason for concluding that disapproval will avert a corporate
harm or open the door to a larger corporate gain every time they
read a proxy statement. Therefore, assume that they rather opti-
mistically, but rationally, assess the probabilities of such an occur-
rence, and consequently assign an expected benefit of $50 per
shareholder to collective action of the sort described, that is, ac-
tion based on each shareholder's reiding the proxy statement,
making up his mind, and voting. If the average cost of informed
shareholder action were simply the opportunity cost"8 of reading
17. E.g., id. § 34 (directors must be elected by shareholders); id. § 73 (majority vote
required to approve plan of merger); id. § 84 (majority vote required to approve plan of
dissolution).
18. The cost attributable to doing one thing to the exclusion of another stems from
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the proxy statement before sending in the proxy card, say $120 per
shareholder (six hours of reading at $20 per hour-a very low esti-
mate), then the total cost of collective action would be high-$1.2
million. This cost would still be less than the actual benefit to be
gained from collective action by informed voters. The cost of such
collective action, however, greatly exceeds the expected bene-
fit-$120 versus $50 per shareholder-so that sensible sharehold-
ers will not read the proxy statement. They will be rationally
apathetic. At the same time, management will be shielded from
shareholder policing of their fiduciary duties, thereby allowing
them to receive compensation that is unnecessary to induce their
services.
Consider now some legal rules that at first blush seem to result
in effective shareholder control despite this apathy. The law gen-
erally allows a shareholder who is not aligned with management
to solicit proxies in opposition to management from his fellow
shareholders. 9 A single shareholder of X might expend $120 in
reading the proxy statement and discovering a reason to disap-
prove the merger plan, and $50,000 in conducting a (very econom-
ical) proxy solicitation 0 that would reduce the opportunity cost of
investigation by other shareholders to an amount that would in-
duce collective action. Just reading the first few sentences of a
countersolicitation, for example, might lead the solicited share-
holder to revise upward the expected benefit of reading further,
while the body of the counterstatement might greatly reduce the
total time and cost that the shareholder spends on reading, since
the points to consider would be highlighted. The undesirable
merger proposal would then be disapproved, and the shareholders
would gain $1,000 per block less whatever opportunity costs they
actually incur.
This scenario will not occur, however, if the guardian share-
holder cannot recover his $50,120 in costs, for that figure greatly
exceeds his own actual and expected benefits. In some jurisdic-
tions, it appears that successful insurgents in a proxy contest may
recover their expenses from the corporation if certain require-
ments are met,2 but this rule apparently has been applied only in
opportunities sacrificed to pursue the chosen course. This sacrifice is called "opportunity
cost." See P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMIcs 449 (8th ed. 1973).
19. See E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 7, at 31.
20. Id. at 541-44.
21. Successful insurgents may be reimbursed from corporate funds for expenses in-
curred in a proxy fight, provided (1) reimbursement is ratified by a majority of the share-
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cases in which the insurgents succeeded in electing a controlling
majority of the directors. 2 This restriction on reimbursement oc-
curs because the corporation is not generally obligated to make
reimbursement. 23 Moreover, even if the insurgent who success-
fully caused a proposed organic corporate change to be defeated
or approved were regularly reimbursed for all his expenses, as of
right, the guardian shareholder still would not be induced to take
action. This is because he does not know ex ante whether investi-
gating any particular proposed corporate action will pay off.
Therefore, in order to induce guardian behavior, the guardian
shareholder must be compensated for the risk of engaging in such
behavior. Conceivably, he could be paid some multiple of his ac-
tual expenses in a successful case of insurgency with the multiple
being based on the frequency of successful investigation.
For several reasons, it is virtually impossible to implement this
procedure in an ideal way, or even in a very satisfactory way, and
awareness of this fact may discourage policymakers from allowing
the insurgent shareholder to receive risk-adjusted reimbursement.
Ascertaining a frequency figure would depend on whether or not
particular activities were classified as "investigations"-a determi-
nation which would engender tremendous definitional problems.
If the frequency were based on past investigations of a particular
corporation, an adequate sample of data might not be available.
If it involved investigations of all public corporations, or some
class of corporations, the figure might be considered unfair by
managers and shareholders who believe their company to be more
amenable to successful collective action than the average corpora-
tion. Moreover, payment of a multiple of actual expenses might
result in inefficient and aimless investigation. This procedure, like
any cost-based system of reimbursement, would encourage extrav-
agant spending-a problem that would be greatly magnified by a
system that in effect reimburses the investigators for the cost of all
holders, (2) the contest is for corporate policy control rather than personal control, and (3)
the expenses were reasonable both in nature and amount. Steinberg v. Adams, 90 F. Supp.
604, 607-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Rosenfeld v. Fairchild'Engine & Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y.
168, 173, 128 N.E.2d 291, 293, 148 N.Y.S. 168, 173 (1955), both discussed in E. ARANOW &
H. EINHORN, supra note 7, at 569-74.
22. See Phillips v. United Corp., 5 SEC Jud. Dec. 758 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed,
171 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1948), discussed in E. ARANow & H. EINHORN, supra note 7, at
575-77. But see Friedman, Expenses of Corporate Proxy Contests, 51 COLUM. L. Rv. 951,
958 (1951).
23. See Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 173, 128
N.E.2d 291, 293, 148 N.Y.S. 168, 173 (1955).
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their investigations. But, if each guardian shareholder were paid
on the basis of a fixed fee schedule and a legally mandated multi-
plier, other difficulties would ensue. For example, there would be
a tendency to make the multiplier a simple reflection of the aver-
age success ratio of investigations. If the multiplier were stipu-
lated and kept from rising by regulators, it would tend to be
arbitrary, since regulators have no practical way of finding the op-
timal figure. In summary, the shareholder-sponsored proxy con-
test is not an adequate solution to the rational apathy problem.
B. The Free Rider Problem
Another legal approach toward improving the efficiency of
collective action is to make it cheaper for each shareholder to act
in an informed way. Suppose that in our example the opportunity
cost of reading the proxy statement concerning the proposed
merger were only $10 per shareholder, because the Securities and
Exchange Commission had devised a system of proxy rules that
produced extremely concise, quickly understandable proxy state-
ments that emphasize crucial data.24 Suppose that the Commis-
sion also monitors the statement and requires that the crucial
information appear in bold face type.25 The expected benefit of
collective action by informed voting is still $50 per shareholder,
but the cost of such action is now only $10 per shareholder. The
net expected benefit is therefore $40 per shareholder. Yet the de-
sired collective action still may not occur.
Any one shareholder may realize that only fifty percent of the
shareholders are needed to block the merger. If the shareholder
believes that enough other shareholders will respond to the incen-
tive of the $40 net expected benefit and will act accordingly to
produce the desirable collective result, he might decide to save
himself the cost of reading the streamlined proxy statement. He
can still participate in any benefits of collective action obtained by
the other shareholders.
Under this assumption, the net expected benefit of the share-
holder's action as a "free rider" would be $50 rather than $40. Yet
it may also occur to him that if all the shareholders thought simi-
larly, no collective action would be taken, and everyone would
lose the chance of reaping the benefits. The temptation to achieve
an individual gain superior to everyone else's may jeopardize the
24. See E. ARANOW & H. EINHoRN, supra note 7, at 179-82.
25. Id. at 180-81.
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attainment of collective benefits. The situation is like the pris-
oner's dilemma of game theory26 and may call for solutions simi-
lar in strategy to those that would solve that dilemma.
One might try to solve the free rider problem by having .the
corporation reimburse each shareholder who incurs reasonable in-
vestigative costs with respect to a proposed corporate action. This
procedure would spread the costs of collective action among all
the shareholders in accordance with their pro rata interest in the
company. It would be impractical, however, since the transac-
tional costs of processing reimbursements would be prohibitive,
and adequate verification of the shareholders' investigative efforts
would be virtually impossible.
As in the rational apathy situation, a shareholder-sponsored
proxy contest is at least a theoretically possible approach to the
problem. The would-be free riders would probably read at least
the first few lines of any purported countersolicitation. Assuming
that the guardian shareholder is reimbursed for his expenses, he
would be willing to incur the investigative costs necessary to so-
licit a sufficient number of proxies. But the problem again arises
that a suboptimal number of proxy contests will be waged unless
the initiators are compensated for the risk of losing some of their
struggles, a condition which legal policymakers seem unwilling to
satisfy.27
C. The Fairness Problem
Let us again alter the hypothetical so that the free rider prob-
lem, like the rational apathy problem, effectively disappears. Sup-
pose that one shareholder, A, owns 200,000 shares, while every
other shareholder owns only one block of 100 shares. The other
facts remain the same. The expected benefit to A is now $100,000,
which is likely to be more than the expected cost of reading the
proxy statement ($120) and waging an economical but successful
proxy contest ($50,000). Unless it deeply galls A to think that he
will be treated unfairly, he will take action to achieve the collec-
tive benefit even though he cannot be adequately reimbursed for
the costs and risks of such action.28 Acting strictly for his own
benefit, he will nevertheless have created a collective good for all
26. See M. BACHARACH, ECONOMICS AND THE THEORY OF GAMES 61-64 (1977).
27. See text accompanying notes 16-23 supra.
28. We can assume that A will not be a free rider since his particular expected benefit
is high, and he, therefore, would presumably not risk depending on action by other share-
holders.
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the other shareholders in the company. The smaller shareholders
will get the benefit of his concern without bearing a pro rata share
of the cost. This phenomenon is an example of what one econo-
mist calls the systematic exploitation of the large by the small.29
The problem is one of fairness to the guardian shareholder.
Less obviously, problems of allocative efficiency may also arise.
The prospect of being taken advantage of by the smaller share-
holders may deter investors from becoming dominant sharehold-
ers in the first place. The problem once again resembles the
prisoners' dilemma, but in this situation the players are all inves-
tors as they contemplate buying into any publicly held corpora-
tion. But in the real world there are many factors which tempt
investors to obtain large percentage interests in companies, not the
least of which is the chance of acquiring the various special bene-
fits of controlling the corporation on an ongoing basis. 30 Any
force toward misallocation created by the phenomenon of ex-
ploitation of the large by the small is likely to be more than offset
by these other factors. Thus, the only real problem will be unfair
treatment of the large, but not controlling, shareholder who un-
dertakes a proxy contest or similar action for the corporation's
benefit. As in the previous hypotheticals, legal rules providing for
reimbursement of proxy contest expenditures may alleviate the
problem, but are not likely to deal adequately with the problem of
compensating active shareholders for the risks they bear.
D. General Solutions to the Collective Action Problems
Legal rules have been crucial in the creation of two powerful
devices for overcoming the problem of rational apathy and the
other barriers to effective and fair collective action. These devices
are the shareholders' derivative suit and the corporate takeover.
The first does not depend at all on the transferability of shares, or
on the fact that common shares typically have voting power; the
second device does.
The derivative suit solves collective action problems in an in-
genious way. It allows the burden of taking action on behalf of
the collectivity of shareholders to be transferred to the plaintiffs
attorney. The plaintiff-shareholder is really a figurehead who has
little concern for the costs of the suit since the attorney's compen-
sation is customarily contingent upon success. The system further
29. See M. OLSON, JR., supra note 12, at 35.
30. See text accompanying notes 43-44 infra.
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ensures that the successful attorney is compensated both for the
immediate costs of litigation and for the risks of taking action be-
cause court awards of attorney's fees in derivative actions do allow
the risk element to be taken into account.31 And it automatically
spreads the costs among all shareholders who benefit from the
successful derivative suit, since the plaintiffs attorney is generally
paid out of the benefit conferred by the suit upon the corpora-
tion.3z
Consider any of the three variations of our hypothetical. An
enterprising plaintiffs attorney might assess the expected benefit
to Corporation X of his reading the proxy statement and making
related investigations at $500,000 or more.3 3 If he were successful
in a suit after the merger against the officers of X alleging that
they were taking part of the merger price as a bribe, he might
recover risk-adjusted compensation for all his costs, provided that
they did not exceed the limit for contingency fees. 34 Prospectively,
he might contemplate an expenditure of time and effort that,
billed at a rate reflecting a normal risk of failure, would yield him-
self $150,000. As his investigation proceeded and new facts
emerged, this estimate would of course be revised-in our exam-
ple, sharply upward. The amount of upward revision would de-
pend on the details of the particular case. While the cost of a
derivative suit is not always less than the cost of a proxy contest, it
is often the cheaper or more feasible alternative.
The derivative suit solves collective action problems by mak-
ing it possible for any shareholder, acting unilaterally, to authorize
an agent to seek a collective benefit and to be compensated by all
31. To be sure, this procedure is subject to difficulties similar to those that would
plague risk-adjusted reimbursement of insurgent shareholders who lead proxy contests.
The special dispensation to shareholder suits may simply reflect the courts' belief that judi-
cial scrutiny of managerial actions yields better outcomes than the reactions of public
shareholders subjected to propaganda campaigns, or it may be an historical "accident," Le,
a fact that is hard to rationalize.
For factors sometime considered in awarding fees to a successful plaintiffs attorney in a
derivative suit, see Angoff v. Goldfine, 270 F.2d 185, 188-89 (1st Cir. 1959); Newmark v.
RKO General, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 161, 163-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). See also Cole, CounselFees
in Stockholders' Derivative and Class Actions-Hornstein Revisited, 6 U. RICH. L. REV. 259
(1972).
32. See Cole, supra note 31, at 261-62.
33. He might assess the expected benefit as being substantially below this amount.
While shareholders may take remedial action, such as voting for new, more competent
directors, the recovery in a derivative suit would be the loss of anticipated profits resulting
from the directors' misbehavior, an amount which is often difficult to prove.
34. This limit typically is set at 30% of the recovery. See Cole, supra note 31, at
283-85.
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shareholders if he succeeds. The corporate takeover, on the other
hand, solves collective action problems by making it possible for
any person, whether or not an existing shareholder, to become the
princopalpart ofthe collectivity of interests whose welfare the cor-
poration is designed to serve. A person establishes this status by
acquiring a majority of the corporation's voting shares. Consider
one who, in our example, foresees an expected benefit to Corpora-
tion X of $500,000, to be gained from investigating a proposed
merger and pursuing a desirable course of collective action. After
conducting a minimal investigation and discovering that the com-
pany is really worth $60 million, he might attempt to capture part
of the potential benefit to X by buying as many of its shares as he
can at the lowest available price.
For the takeover to succeed and be a socially useful mecha-
nism, there must be voting rights, they must be susceptible to be-
ing bought and sold, and their purchaser must be able to obtain a
reward for having expended funds to obtain control. The value of
the takeover does not depend, however, on whether the voting
rights are ever exercised by the shareholders in ordinary times. If
the corporate takeover is of great value in solving collective action
problems, and if no better solution exists which renders it unnec-
essary, then it need not bother us that shareholders are generally
apathetic about voting, or that most shareholder votes are mere
expressions of confidence in management. Nor is it of any great
concern that the voting system creates costs because companies
must comply with the associated disclosure requirements and
proxy rules.35
Yet the great expense of maintaining a voting system-a sys-
tem justified primarily by the relatively rare transfers of corporate
power it makes possible-and the realization that not all corpo-
rate takeovers are for the better leads one to ask whether the de-
rivative suit alone is an adequate device for overcoming barriers
to collective action. Why not complete the process of separating
ownership and control by making all shares nonvoting, or by re-
moving obstacles, such as stock exchange rules, 36 to the use of
35. For similar views, see M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION
66-67 (1976); Manne, Mergers and the Marketfor Corporate Control, 73 J. PoL. ECON. 110,
112-13 (1965); Manne, Some TheoreticalApects of Share Voting, 64 COLUM. L. RnV. 1427,
1430-34 (1964); Manne, The "Higher Criticism" of the Modern Corporation, 62 COLUM. L.
REV. 399, 410-12 (1962).
36. E.g., NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANOE, INC., COMPANY MANUAL § A15, at A-280
(policy of refusing to list the shares of a corporation which has nonvoting common stock
outstanding). Similar policies are expressed in the Public Utility Holding Company Act of
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nonvoting shares? Why not allow managements to elect their own
successors, as is done in many charitable corporations? Why not
trust litigation, including class actions and SEC proceedings as
well as derivative suits, to ensure managerial accountability?
The primary reason that the derivative suit and the takeover
mechanism are both desirable as remedies for the failure of
corporate fiduciaries to maximize the welfare of their beneficiaries
is that the strengths inherent in each tend to compensate for the
weaknesses of the other. Derivative suits deal well with cases of
managerial fraud, self-dealing, and other misconduct, and in some
situations have a strong relative advantage. A takeover, on the
other hand, may be prompted by any sag in the ratio of a firm's
market value to its potential value, whether caused by continuing
misconduct, by managerial incompetence or negligence, or simply
by the fact that some outsiders are so positioned that they can take
the firm in new directions to a higher value. Even an honest, ca-
pable, and hard-working management may sometimes find its
firm the subject of a takeover attempt that would produce net so-
cial benefits if it succeeded.
Though derivative suits result in hundreds of reported cases
each decade, it is difficult to find any that resulted in judgments
against the defendants based on simple negligence, uncomplicated
by fraud or self-dealing.37 The reason for this lies in the most
fundamental postulate of the modem publicly held corporation:
business decisions must be made by managers and not by share-
holders. It is time consuming and expensive for any individual
decisionmaker to gather the relevant information and engage in
the analytical process necessary to make a significant business de-
cision. With less centralization of management, shareholders
would waste intolerable amounts of time replicating the exper-
iences of corporate officers or would succumb to the rational apa-
thy and free rider problems. With greater centralization of
management, the assertion of any individual shareholder that he
knows better than the managers how to run the company borders
1935, § 7(c)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 79g(c)(l)(A) (1976) (forbidding sale of common shares with-
out "at least equal voting rights" with other outstanding securities of the company); Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940, § 18(i), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(i) (1976) (generally barring
issuance of nonvoting shares); the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, § 1123(a)(6), 11 U.S.C.
§ 1123(a)(6) (Supp. 1979) (barring issuance of nonvoting equity securities by a reorganized
debtor).
37. See Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemn/cation of
Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE LJ. 1078, 1099 (1968); DYKsTRA, The Revival of
the Derivative Suit, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 74, 74 (1967).
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on hubris. The law essentially tells him that if he feels that way,
he should try to become a key manager--either by being hired as
an officer or being elected as a director, or by taking control of the
company. He has no right to a court order that countermands a
management decision, even if he could somehow demonstrate that
his business acumen was superior to that of management. Thus,
only where the managers are not really acting as managers, that is,
as fiduciaries using other people's money in a business, but in
their own self-interest, does the law allow the shareholder to chal-
lenge managerial conduct.
These considerations explain why the law requires that before
a derivative suit can be maintained the shareholder must demand
that the directors take action about the alleged wrong. They also
explain the difficulty he faces in proceeding with the suit unless he
can allege convincingly that the directors participated in the al-
leged wrong or cannot be trusted to act on the matter in a disinter-
ested manner. Nevertheless, the derivative suit often surpasses
other mechanisms for dealing with managerial misconduct. It can
be aimed at specific past instances of misconduct and can produce
a recovery for the corporation that exceeds the costs of the suit.
By contrast, the enormous amount of investment capital required
for a successful tender offer may cause substantial financing
problems for the aggrieved shareholder. Furthermore, the trans-
actional costs of a takeover may be great enough to render the
entire process counterproductive. Moreover, taking control of the
company may enable the purchaser to halt managerial theft and
self-dealing, but it will not automatically effect recovery of past
misappropriations. Consequently, the prospect of being taken
over does not deter managers from engaging in large, "one-shot"
raids on the corporate treasury. In other words, market controls
discipline managers only in the case of repeated or continuing
wrongs, whereas legal controls can respond to singular wrongs.38
The first part of this article has argued that the traditional
38. In this context, "controls" mean practices that guide one's behavior toward a so-
cial norm, such as honesty or efficiency. "Market controls" influence those who voluntarily
enter into commercial transactions. For example, it is a generally held norm that individu-
als should repay money lent to them. Persons who default on their promises to repay may
find it difficult to obtain credit on favorable terms in the future. Because many people will
observe this consequence of default and consider its relevance to themselves, the rate of
default may be lower than it would be if it were always possible to get new loans on the
same terms as anyone else, regardless of one's credit record. In this terminology, the differ-
ence between the rate of default between the real and hypothetical state of affairs would be
described as due to market controls because managers tempted to run their companies in a
19791
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
proxy contest is an ineffective method of collective action and that
the corporate takeover is a necessary device for staving off pro-
spective wrongs, and therefore must exist in addition to the deriv-
ative suit as a means for ensuring managerial accountability.
Since the takeover depends upon the transferability of voting
rights, some form of vote buying-as opposed to the acquisition of
proxies by sheer education, argument, and persuasion-is neces-
sary to overcome rational shareholder apathy and the free rider
obstacle to fair and effective collective action.
II. THE ARGUMENTS CONCERNING VOTE BUYING
A. The Categories of Vote Buying
Before discussing the basic arguments for and against vote
buying, one must distinguish several situations in which corporate
voting rights might be bought. There are four fundamentally dif-
ferent kinds of vote buying.
(1) Standard share buying. A person who acquires voting
rights by purchasing voting common shares in a corporation that
has no other common shares with lesser or greater voting rights
per share engages in "standard share buying." An example is the
purchase of any number of voting common shares in a corpora-
tion that has only one class of common shares. Such a purchase
may or may not give the purchaser control of the corporation. If it
does, the transaction is likely to be subject to special rules,39 but it
can hardly be objectionable simply because votes are being
bought. Standard share buying is generally considered legitimate
by everyone except those who are against letting shareholders
have any voting rights at all.
suboptimal way may think that doing so may increase the risk that an outsider will take
over the company and displace them.
"Legal controls" are controls that operate through the promulgation and enforcement
of statutes, regulations, and decisional law. For example, if the rate of default on loans is
lower than it would be if creditors could not seize and sell the property of debtors pursuant
to judicial authority, then the difference would be described as the result of legal controls.
Derivative suits are, of course, part of a system of legal controls.
39. See, e.g., Williams Act, § 14(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(l) (1976) (disclosure re-
quirements regarding any tender offer which would result in the offeror's ownership of
more than 5% of a class of equity securities registered under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(d)-(e) (1976)); Williams Act, § 13(d)(l), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)
(1976) (disclosure of the same information as § 14(d)(1), but not until as late as 10 days
after a party has acquired, by any means, more than 5% of a class of registered equity
securities).
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(2) Equity-centered vote buying. A purchaser may acquire vot-
ing rights that are disproportionate to his share of the equity inter-
est in the corporation, that is, disproportionate to his right to the
corporation's residual earnings, yet his chief interest in acquiring
voting rights may be the protection of his equity interest. The eq-
uity interest may be preexisting or it may be acquired in the same
transaction in which the voting rights are acquired. An example
of the former situation is embodied by the hypothetical which in-
troduces this article: a three percent shareholder wants to buy
proxies from the other shareholders in order to elect directors who
will act in the interest of the three percent shareholder in his status
as equity claimant. An example of the latter situation is the
purchase of voting common shares in a corporation which also has
a significant number of nonvoting common shares outstanding, or
some other class of common shares which have lesser voting rights
per share.
Equity-centered vote buying of the second variety is clearly
disfavored. For example, the New York Stock Exchange gener-
ally refuses to list nonvoting common stock, and supports the no-
tion that shareholder voting rights should bear a reasonable
relationship to the actual underlying equity interest the share-
holder possesses.4 In effect, this verges on a presumption that
standard share buying is the only legitimate kind of vote buying.
Yet there are legal rules that accommodate some equity-centered
vote buying of the second type. As an obvious example, state cor-
poration laws generally do allow nonvoting common stock to be
issued.41 Various corporate devices also exist which skew the rela-
tionship between equity interest and voting rights, including
noncumulative voting and staggered elections of directors;
pyramiding, or the leveraging of voting rights by the use of a se-
ries of holding companies; and classes of stock with equal voting
rights per share but vastly different par values and sales prices.
Equity-centered vote buying of the first type, for example, the
purchase of proxies, seems to be outlawed by most state statutes
and disallowed by judicial opinions that have dealt with vote buy-
ing cases.42
40. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC., COMPANY MANuAL § AI5, at A-281 (alloca-
tion of voting power to classes of stock other than common stock normally should be in
reasonable relationship to the equity interests of such other classes).
41. See, e.g., MBCA § 15.
42. See Note, Shareholder Vote Buying-4 Rebuttable Presumption of fllegally, 1968
Wisc. L. REv. 927. The commentator argues that although the cases are usually cited as
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(3) Special interest vote buying. A purchaser may acquire vot-
ing fights for the principal purpose, or with the principal effect, of
improving his ability to maintain or develop a non-shareholder
business relationship with the company. The non-shareholder re-
lationship with the company may be that of a supplier, creditor,
employee, customer, tax collector, or regulatory agency. This
"special interest vote buying" frequently involves equity-centered
vote buying or standard share buying as well. For example, a
shareholder might buy proxies in order to elect directors who will
hire him as the company's chief executive officer. A holding com-
pany of a firm's major supplier might buy a controlling block of
its voting stock in order to control the directorial make-up of the
firm and consequently assure the continuation of the business re-
lationship. Or, a consortium of customers may engage in standard
share buying to acquire control of the company, with the principal
purpose of benefitting their non-shareholder interest in the firm's
output.4 3 In these mixed situations, it is crucial to determine
whether the element of special interest vote buying is significant or
paramount, since this kind of vote buying usually raises grave
questions of fairness toward the nonselling shareholders.
Finally, the purchaser engaging in special interest vote buying
theoretically might not have previously possessed nor even ob-
tained a formal equity interest in the company. Conceivably,
someone will some day propose that government agencies such as
the Internal Revenue Service should be allowed to purchase a po-
sition on the board of directors of a corporation, with or without
acquiring an equity interest, in order to influence the corporation
to conform to the agency's rules and policies.
(4) Pure vote buying. A purchaser might also acquire voting
fights for the principal purpose, or with the principal effect, of
improving his ability to affect corporate decisions that could help
or hinder attainment of goals he considers desirable, even though
he has no equity interest in nor a non-shareholder business rela-
tionship with the company. A simple example of this type of pur-
chaser is the activist who buys only a few shares in order to gain
standing to wage a proxy contest over an issue of corporate social
responsibility. A more intriguing case, requiring an especially in-
establishing a flat rule against vote selling, a rebuttable presumption actually appears to be
emerging. See also note 10 supra.
43. See, e.g., Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952
(1955).
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trepid activist, is the attempt to buy proxies to influence or control
the vote on an issue of social responsibility. Though existing judi-
cial opinions concerning vote buying may seem to cover pure vote
buying, strong arguments can be made that all such precedents are
distinguishable.
B. The Benefits and Dangers
(1) A morepotent displacement mechanism. The main virtue of
vote buying in general is that it facilitates the displacement of in-
cumbent management either for all purposes, or for the purpose of
making particular corporate decisions. Thus, vote buying may
help to ensure that management will be cognizant of its fiduciary
duty to the shareholders and perhaps, depending on the type of
vote buying involved, aware of its social responsibilities. As out-
lined in Part I, some form of vote buying is important in overcom-
ing rational shareholder apathy and the free-rider problem. 44
That standard share buying is generally blessed as legitimate re-
flects widespread intuitive acceptance of this point; the buying of
votes as well as residual claims simply cannot be justified by the
vague notion that "shareholder democracy" is an ideal.
The question now arises whether all types of vote buying, by
offering a threat of displacement, actually facilitate the control of
managerial discretion in socially desirable ways. If so, they
should be presumed to be legitimate unless countervailing dangers
are identified. If not, they should be outlawed without further in-
quiry.
The answer depends upon one's perception of the proper goals
of a publicly held business corporation. Traditionally, the sole,
legally recognized goal of corporate management has been to
maximize the wealth of the shareholders, within the constraint
that management must honor all legal rules governing its dealings
with other groups affected by the corporation, such as creditors,
customers, taxing authorities, and persons living in the corpora-
tion's environment.4 Within this model, which contemporary le-
gal doctrine has not yet expressly eroded, standard share buying
and equity-centered vote buying appear usefulper se, but may be
44. See text accompanying notes 12-39 supra.
45. For example, customers are protected by the Uniform Commercial Code, the
Consumer Products Safety Act, products liability rules, credit disclosure and fair billing
laws, and the antitrust laws; creditor safeguards include contract law, the law of mortgages
and secured transactions, state-authorized creditor remedies, the Bankruptcy Act, and the
law of fraudulent conveyances.
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detrimental if they are tainted with elements of special interest
vote buying or pure vote buying.
Nonetheless, special interest vote buying and pure vote buying
are not always detrimental. For example, a supplier might want
to buy voting control of a customer company in order to oust an
incorrigibly misguided management and cause the company to
purchase goods from the supplier at a fair price. Both the supplier
and the customer company could conceivably profit more than if
they had each obtained the best available arm's length deal with
other parties. Similarly, a pure vote buyer might seize voting con-
trol of a corporation and cause it to take a socially responsible
action which the former, obdurate management refused to do, and
which, as an incidental result, would increase corporate profits.
Unfortunately, common sense suggests that such outcomes would
flourish less in reality than in the rhetoric of corporate displacers.
As a precaution, one might outlaw vote buying by persons who do
not have or will not have acquired an equity interest in the corpo-
ration. Of course, this rule by itself will hinder but will not pre-
clude those who intend to divert the corporation from its profit
maximizing goal toward other ends. The individual intent on
looting a corporation, for example, can buy the minimal number
of shares needed to control it and then proceed to extract an exces-
sive salary or engage the corporation in unfair dealings with his
wholly-owned.business. This possibility requires a different set of
rules.
Conceivably, the existing legal framework may change in such
a way that a corporation would clearly be permitted to take action
that is adjudged by the directors, or perhaps directly by a majority
of the shareholders, to serve a broader social interest, even though
it might require a sacrifice in the potential market value of the
company's shares. Within such a framework, pure vote buying
might be quite useful, even when the buyer obtains no equity in-
terest, provided that the intent of the scheme is disclosed to the
selling shareholders. Under such a set of ground rules, only spe-
cial interest vote buying would remain deeply suspect.
The most interesting alternative legal framework is probably
the least likely to be adopted. The law could require management
to obey certain legal constraints in its dealings with groups af-
fected by the corporation, and yet allow any possessor of voting
control to cause the corporation to maximize his own interests.
Simple voting rights, not attached to any explicit equity interest,
would be embodied in separate certificates which could be
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purchased by anyone who desires to obtain a share of the control
of the corporation. Within this system, for example, a labor union
representing the corporation's production employees might legiti-
mately attempt to buy a majority of the voting certificates in order
to accommodate rank and file interests in labor negotiations. Any
other group, including the shareholders, would be free to vie for
the same voting certificates. Obviously, any type of vote buying
would be proper within this system, although it might be subject
to special disclosure requirements and to rules designed to elimi-
nate specific dangers and abuses that prove to be characteristic of
pure voting certificates. It is not clear that this mythical system
would work very well; in any event, it seems a rather remote possi-
bility.
(2) An aid to looters. Consider now, within the traditional
model, the chief dangers of vote buying. First, some vote buying
is the first stage in a process which leads to unfair self dealing by
those who gain control. Second, vote selling may constitute a
breach of the selling shareholder's duty to act in the interest of the
corporation as a whole rather than in his own particular interest.
An example of the first danger is provided by the outsider who
wants to buy a control block of stock at a premium over the cur-
rent market price of smaller blocks of the company's shares, yet
does not want to extend his offer to other shareholders because he
intends to get a disproportionate return from his investment after
obtaining control. After buying 51 per cent of the common stock
at a control premium of $51,000, the individual may have himself
elected president and paid a salary excessive in the amount (dis-
counted to present value) of $100,000, the maximum he thought
he could be paid without provoking a derivative suit. If he had
purchased 100 per cent of the stock at the same per share price
paid for the control block, his total premium over market would
be the same as the unfair advantage he hoped to gain, and there
would be no special point to the acquisition. His unwillingness to
pay a control premium to every existing shareholder thus reflects a
desire to maximize future illicit gains. The same would be true if
he had hoped to steal outright from the corporation, or to make it
enter into unfair transactions with a business wholly owned by
himself.
If we define "looter" broadly to mean any person who intends
to enter into an unfairly advantageous relationship of any kind
with the corporation, then we can formulate a simple rule of ac-
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tion for looters: when you plan to loot the controlled company,
buy only the minimum equity interest needed to obtain control,
for the more you own, the more you will simply be looting from
yourself.
On the other hand, a person who wants to obtain control in
order to cause the corporation to do something-for example, ex-
pand into a new line of business-which will increase its value,
normally will not object to having to buy all the company's shares,
as long as he has the funds or financing to do so. He will not even
be deterred by having to pay the same price (and thus, premium)
to all shareholders. If he thinks he can run the company more
efficiently and increase its earnings available for dividends by
$100,000, he will realize that each additional share he buys at a
given price will entitle him to an equal legitimate share in this
future value, and each such purchase will thus yield the same rate
of return, which by his own hypothesis will be an unusually gener-
ous one.
The difference between these two situations is one of the rea-
sons for the "equal opportunity rule" that has been proposed to
govern the sale of control blocks of stock, viz., the offeror need not
offer to buy all the company's stock, but he must offer to buy a pro
rata amount from each existing shareholder at the same price.46 If
in practice this would commonly force the purchaser to acquire all
of the company's outstanding shares because the holder of a con-
trol block generally wishes to sell either all of his stock or none,
then only a potential looter would be discouraged and not the en-
trepreneurial purchaser who can profit from acquiring any addi-
tional shares.47 Such a rule, which has not been adopted by the
courts,48 and other doctrines governing the sale of control49 are
partially attempts to deal with standard share buying that is also
special interest vote buying and may lead to unfairness to the cor-
poration and its shareholders. (Actually, standard share buying,
which is what it seems to be, may also lead to unfair transactions
with the controlling shareholder as such; for example, the buyer of
a control block may cause the corporation to repurchase some of
46. Andrews, The Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Shares, 78
HARV. L. REv. 505, 527-30 (1965).
47. Id. at 517-19.
48. See Javaras, Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Controlling Shares. A Reply to Pro-
fessor Andrews, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 420 (1965).
49. See generally Bayne, The Sale oCorporate Control, 33 FoRD. L. REV. 583 (1965);
Berle, "Control" in Corporate Law, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 1212 (1958).
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his shares at an unfairly excessive price.) These rules certainly do
not attempt to bar purchases of voting control outright.
When it is apparent equity-centered vote buying that may be
disguised special interest vote buying and may lead to unfair
transactions, however, the policymaker may be tempted to impose
an absolute prohibition. The reason is that the normal risks of
looting seem greater. By using Rolls' technique of making a
tender offer for proxies, for example, a clever looter could acquire
control of a corporation with a dollar investment far smaller than
would be necessary to buy a control block of shares, and thus
could extract his looting proceeds almost entirely from the equity
interests of others. That is, at least theoretically, equity-centered
vote buying of this type seems to offer looters the opportunity to
obtain a greater illegitimate return than that available to them
through standard share buying. The difference also arises when-
ever there are voting and nonvoting shares and would be magni-
fied by any rule permitting the outright purchase of permanent
voting rights without the purchase of a corresponding equity inter-
est. Assuming that this opportunity for additional looting is real,
it may stimulate more frequent and more intense efforts by looters
to acquire voting control of companies.
One might be tempted to conclude, therefore, that equity-cen-
tered vote buying (or a particular variation on that theme, such as
the tender offer for proxies) should be categorically forbidden.
But there are good reasons to resist that conclusion. First, on
some occasions, equity-centered vote buying may be the cheapest
or most feasible way for a person sincerely interested in share-
holder welfare to achieve results that benefit the corporation as a
whole. The Rolls hypothetical" was designed to demonstrate
how this might occur in the context of a tender offer for proxies.
One commentator has suggested that the decided vote buying
cases indeed reveal an emerging rebuttable presumption that eq-
uity-centered vote buying is undesirable unless it can be shown
that (1) the shareholders unanimously consent to it; (2) the vote
buyer cannot profit more than other shareholders; (3) no harm can
befall the corporation; or (4) the agreement will confer a substan-
tial benefit on the corporation.5 An objection can be raised that
tender offers for proxies and other types of equity-centered vote
buying are only rarely more effective displacement mechanisms
50. See text accompanying notes 1-7 supra.
51. Note, supra note 42, at 929.
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than ordinary tender offers. After all, the appeal of the Rolls hy-
pothetical depends on the fact that the Creative Fund faces partic-
ular constraints of taxation and regulation. But even if the point
about rarity is true, it seems only to argue for a rule placing the
burden of showing a good business purpose upon the initiator of
the vote buying plan. Moreover, the tender offer for proxies might
have wider use as a means of evading state anti-takeover statutes
that ought to be evaded 2.5
Second, the prevalence of looters and the degree to which they
will respond to the theoretical advantages of equity-centered vote
buying are empirical questions. The extra looting induced by per-
mitting tender offers for proxies might in fact be very small.
Though it is true that one who owns fifty-one percent of the com-
mon stock of a solvent corporation takes fifty-one cents from him-
self for every dollar he loots from the corporation, while a
controlling person who owns only three percent takes only three
cents from himself per dollar looted, the fifty-one percent share-
holder does have an incentive to loot. Granted, if the probability
of being caught increases as the gross amount of looting proceeds
increases, the three percent shareholder may have an incentive to
extract an even greater amount than a similarly situated fifty-one
percent shareholder because he can expect a greater return for
each unit of additional risk that he takes. Whether this considera-
tion is significant in practice depends on a multiplicity of other
factors, such as the particular degree of risk aversion of the indi-
vidual looters. It is not even clear that the risk of being caught
varies as suggested: the three percent shareholder's risk may be
greater because he is beset by a greater number of potential
monitors. Moreover, a temptation to loot is presented to corpo-
rate officers of huge, publicly held corporations over which they
have de facto control but comparatively little stock. Looting oc-
curs, but it is not generally regarded as intolerable.
Third, any looting that actually follows equity-centered vote
buying will violate existing legal rules against embezzlement,
fraud, or self-dealing. In both the tralitional sale of control cases
and the hypothetical involving the tender offer for proxies, one
may legitimately ask why the law should focus on the point at
which control shifts, and regulate the shifting, rather than deal
with the looting itself. After all, self-dealing can occur at any time
in a corporation's life, not just in the wake of a shift of control; the
52. R. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONs, 618-19 (1976).
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temptation to loot is presented to anyone other than a sole owner,
who has control, regardless of how control was obtained. If the
explanation is that the rules against self-dealing-for example, the
ubiquitous "fairness" test of transactions between a corporation
and its directors-are not very effective, then the proper response
is to make these rules stricter or to enforce them more rigorously.
Fourth, effective disclosure laws provide further protection
from potential looters. If the tender offeror for proxies fails to
disclose his nonshareholder relationship, or fails to disclose his
plan or even lies about it, the shareholder might have the alterna-
tive remedies of proving that the relationship was unfair or that
the offeror violated his disclosure duties. The latter may be less
expensive and more easily accomplished.
Fifth, the self-interest of vote sellers will lead them to be pru-
dent about selling their votes. They will not knowingly sell to
looters, or possible looters, as long as they continue to hold a por-
tion of the equity interest in the company. Indeed, this fact could
potentially chill all but the more clearly desirable tender offers for
proxies. To a much lesser extent, it also applies when some stock
is to be permanently converted to nonvoting status. Interestingly,
this protection does not operate in the conventional sale of control
situation, where the controlling person or persons usually sell out
their entire interest in the company. In this context, the old con-
trolling group might be unconcerned that they might sell to loot-
ers. Yet the law does not prohibit sales of control blocks; it only
stipulates that the sellers have a duty to the nonselling sharehold-
ers not to sell to persons whom they know or should know intend
to loot the company. 3 Afortiori, the law should not flatly pro-
hibit all sales of proxies.
(3) An occasion forfiduciary lapse by shareholders. The second
chief danger of vote buying is that it may occasion a breach of
fiduciary duty by the vote seller in his capacity as shareholder. In
the view of the Restatement of Contracts, for example, it is cor-
rupt for an officer or shareholder of a corporation to take personal
consideration for the exercise of his powers of management in a
particular way.-4 In the conventional sale of control, the seller
may act to maximize his own self-interest by selling voting control
53. Id. at 618-19, 847-50.
54. "A bargain by an official or shareholder of a corporation for a consideration enur-
ing to him personally to exercise or promise to exercise his powers in the management of
the corporation in a particular way is illegal." RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRAc s § 569 (1932).
1979]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [
to the bidder who offers the highest price, while at the same time
inviting injury to the corporation by selling to a determined looter.
The seller of control might also collude with the buyer to de-
fraud the other shareholders. In fact, this basic factual pattern, or
sdmething like it, characterizes many of the cases that purport to
outlaw vote buying." Suppose, for example, that Corporation X
is owned by five shareholders. A owns sixty percent of the com-
mon shares, while B, C, D and E each own ten percent. There
are ten directors, six of whom are A's obedient nominees.
Corporation Y suggests that X sell its assets to Y at a price which
4 knows to be $10 million short of what other prospective buyers
would be willing to pay. Y offers to pay $7 million to A if he
recommends and votes for the plan and the sale actually occurs.
If the offer is accepted and the deal completed, X loses $10 million
of potential profit and Y gains $10 million before payment to A.
A's share of the $10 million loss is $6 million, but he receives a
cash payment of $7 million, leaving him a net gain of $1 million.
Corporation Y has a net gain of $3 million and the minority
shareholders of X suffer a net loss of $4 million. What has oc-
curred is clearly a form of theft.
In a real and slightly more complicated case,56 the defendant
agreed to pay the plaintiff to vote for selection of a railroad depot
site near the defendant's land. If the site were chosen, the defend-
ant's land would greatly appreciate in value. The court seemed
unconvinced by testimony that the site was the one most suitable
for the plaintiffs corporation, and the vote selling agreement was
held improperY.5  The case is interesting because, unlike the situa-
tion in the hypothetical just described, what the defendant would
have gained was not necessarily what the corporation would have
lost; indeed, it is conceivable that the best interests of the defend-
Directors and other officials act in a fiduciary capacity and should exercise
their powers with untrammeled judgment. Therefore a bargain, the tendency of
which is to induce them to consider not simply the advantage of the corporation,
but their own personal advantage distinct from the interest of the corporation is
illegal. So likewise a shareholder is under a similar duty with reference to his
voting powers. The rule stated in the Section has no application, however, to
agreements where the only advantage bargained .for is that which may accrue
through the ownership of shares in the corporation.
Id., Comment a.
55. See, e.g., Palmbaum v. Magulsky, 217 Mass. 306, 104 N.E. 746 (1914); Fuller v.
Dame, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 472 (1836); Macht v. Merchants Mortgage & Credit Co., 22 Del.
Ch. 74, 194 A. 19 (1937); Dieckmann v. Robyn, 162 Mo. App. 67, 141 S.W. 717 (1911).
56. Fuller v. Dame, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 472 (1836).
57. Id. at 481-82.
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ant and the corporation coincided.58
While the possibility that vote sellers may violate a fiduciary
duty is a real danger, it does not entail an automatic prohibition of
vote sellingper se. No one has suggested that standard share sell-
ing which results in a shift of control should be flatly prohibited
because the seller of control may tolerate or even actively cooper-
ate in the buyer's misbehavior. Moreover, the susceptibility of eq-
uity-centered vote selling to this danger varies. Where the buyer
of proxies acquires them from one or a few controlling sharehold-
ers, collusion to defraud the minority shareholders may be quite
likely. A relatively heavy burden might be imposed on the vote
buyer to prove a reasonable benefit to the corporation. By con-
trast, it would be enough precaution to insist that the public
tender offer for proxies, which presents much less danger of collu-
sion, be made to all shareholders on equal terms, and that if more
proxies are tendered than the offeror wishes to buy, he must
purchase them pro rata from all of the tendering shareholders.59
C. Some Possible Analogies and Lesser Arguments
A corporate lawyer's probable instinct when confronted with
the Rolls hypothetical concerning a tender offer for proxies is to
think about apparently analogous situations for which there are
established rules. While this process may lead to a better under-
standing of the problems of vote buying and the relationships be-
tween various legal rules, it likely will not uncover any
fundamental policy considerations other than the three discussed
in the preceding section, viz., the benefit of serving as a displace-
ment mechanism, and the dangers of looting by vote buyers and
breach of fiduciary duty by vote sellers.
The analogy to the traditional sale of control case has been
touched upon at various points above. The tender offer for prox-
ies may be categorized as a sale of control in which the buyer pays
only the control premium, and not the price of the shares them-
selves, as equity investments. This description suggests no new
policy arguments.
The particular vote-buying plan in the Rolls hypothetical can
58. Perhaps such a benefit should constitute an affirmative defense. See text accom-
panying note 54 supra.
59. Cf. Williams Act, § 14(d)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1976) (equal terms require-
ment for conventional tender offer); id. § 14(d)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (pro rata require-
ment for conventional tender offer).
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be compared to a de facto merger6 1 plan, since its purpose is to
elect directors who will cause the company to combine with an-
other. Yet, since a formal merger is contemplated, it seems point-
less to apply the rules of the de facto merger doctrine,61 such as
giving the shareholders appraisal rights62 at the time of the vote
buying offer.
Buying shareholder votes can also be analogized to paying a
director to vote a certain way on an issue. Such a practice is inva-
riably regarded as corrupt.63 The issues raised by this analogy
were discussed in connection with breach of fiduciary duty of the
selling shareholders. 64 The duties of a director with respect to vot-
ing are different from those of a shareholder in that the share-
holder can sell his underlying equity interest along with his vote,
while the director cannot sell his position as director. But this dif-
ference seems only to support the existing rule that automatically
prohibits a director from selling his right to vote as a director. It
does not aid the development of proper rules governing the
purchase of shareholder votes, which, absent collusion, is not nec-
essarily corrupt.
Another obvious analogy is the analogy to voting trusts and
voting agreements, which are generally legitimate provided that
they comply with the applicable legal restrictions.65 If the partici-
pants in a voting trust can transfer their voting rights in return for
valuable consideration 66 while retaining the equity interest repre-
sented by the shares, does not consistency require that sharehold-
ers be able to sell their votes for cash? A distinction based on the
type of consideration for giving up one's voting power seems to be
without substance. This analogical argument is weak, however.
Voting trusts and vote pooling agreements are basically devices
created to solve the peculiar and troublesome collective action
problems of closely held corporations, such as the difficulty of
achieving cooperation and avoiding voting deadlocks. Their ra-
60. A de facto merger is a transaction (or multiple transactions), usually involving a
sale of corporate assets or a stock acquisition or both, which is essentially a merger despite
attempts to label it otherwise. Certain incidents characteristic of statutory mergers are,
therefore, applied to it. See D. HERwiTz, BUSINESS PLANNING 698 (1966).
61. See generally id. at 697-723.
62. See MBCA §§ 73-74.
63. See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
64. See text accompanying notes 57-62 supra.
65. See MBCA § 32.
66. The consideration is the transfer by others of their voting rights to the same trust
on specific terms with respect to a voting agreement; the consideration for each participat-
ing shareholder is the other participants' promises to vote in a certain way.
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tionale cannot be assumed to justify vote selling in the context of
publicly held corporations. One is forced back to the more basic
policy considerations discussed above.
One can also draw an analogy between the tender offer for
proxies and the conventional tender offer for shares. The argu-
ment can be made that the tender offer statutes are aimed not pri-
marily at offers to purchase shares, but at offers that may result in
shifts of control and that impose pressures on shareholders or ex-
pose them to certain risks;67 that the tender offer for proxies in-
volves the same pressures and risks; and that the tender offer
statutes therefore should be interpreted or amended to cover
tender offers for proxies. This logic may be intrinsically correct,
but it produces no important recommendations. A tender offeror
for proxies might easily comply with the Williams Act.68 State
laws governing vote buying are the real obstacles.69 Moreover, the
wisdom of various features of the takeover laws, regardless of
their applicability to the tender offer for proxies, has been contin-
ually questioned.
Selling one's vote is also comparable to creating a new class of
nonvoting stock without complying with the usual requirements
for creating new classes of stock, such as amending the articles of
incorporation in accordance with statutory procedures. 70 This is
purely a procedural issue that by itself reveals nothing about
whether shareholders should be allowed to sell proxies in the first
place.
The tender offer for proxies might be further compared to a
proxy contest in which the contestants spend funds to entertain
shareholders whom they are attempting to solicit. It is not clear
whether such expenditures are considered by the courts to be il-
legitimate per se, illegitimate only when excessive, or not illegiti-
mate at all.71 In any event, insightful judicial reasoning
concerning the propriety of such expenditures is not available, so
that the analogy to the proxy contest cases is not helpful.
Finally, corporate vote buying can be compared to vote buying
67. See Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the Securities Ex-
change Act of1934, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1250, 1270 (1973) (arguing that Williams Act was
designed to cover all offers which have a capacity to pressure shareholders into making
uninformed, ill-considered decisions on whether to sell their securities, regardless of
whether any takeover intent exists).
68. See note 39 supra.
69. See note 10 supra.
70. See MBCA § 55, 54.
71. See E. ARANow & H. EINHORNq, supra note 7, at 595.
1979]
CASE WESTEPRN RESERVE L4W REVIEW
in the political arena, where it is clearly improper. But the two
contexts are distinguishable in many ways. As in the corporate
area, displacement of incumbent politicians by voting citizens is
subject to severe rational apathy and free rider problems. Political
campaigns, like proxy battles for corporate control, may some-
times help to alleviate these problems, and they certainly occur
more frequently. But in the political arena, nothing corresponds
to the derivative suit as a way to overcome difficulties of collective
action; an individual citizen cannot sue "on behalf of' the polity
to remove an incompetent politician or to force him to return em-
bezzled funds. Nor does anything correspond to the conventional
corporate takeover. The parallel would be a widespread purchase
of citizen "statuses," or bundles of legal duties, tax liabilities, and
rights to receive specific governmental benefits and to enjoy public
benefits. But citizen status is not saleable, because it is tailored to
each citizen's particular characteristics; for example, those with
greater ability to pay taxes are generally required to pay a greater
proportion of their income.
In view of these relative disadvantages of the political process,
one might suggest that the case for political vote buying is even
stronger. The answer to such a suggestion, however, is compel-
ling. The rich would have an advantage in election campaigns
greater than what they already possess. That the rich have an ad-
vantage in corporate takeovers and proxy contests is not much
more objectionable than the fact that the rich can buy better tele-
vision sets. But the rich politician's advantage is an especially sus-
pect phenomenon. For one thing, elected politicians can
legitimately influence the distribution of governmental benefits by
voting, for example, for a program with a particular redistributive
impact. A dutiful corporate director or officer, on the other hand,
usually cannot change the extent to which each share of stock can
participate in the residual earnings of the enterprise. Further-
more, the possibility that vote buyers will be looters is more seri-
ous in the political context, because the protections against
political looting are weaker. The candidate seeking election to po-
litical office is not subject to any disclosure laws that approximate
the federal securities laws in the severity of their affirmative dis-
closure requirements or, more importantly, in the remedies which
they provide for fraud and nondisclosure. There is no citizens'
derivative suit to redress any political looting that might occur af-
ter vote buying. The self-interest of the vote sellers would provide
no protection, for even rampant political looting by the vote buyer
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may have little or no impact on the governmental benefits which
the vote sellers might expect to obtain, especially if they are in a
socioeconomic group that is little affected by current governmen-
tal programs. And finally, there is a great danger that vote sellers
would breach their duties as citizens by colluding with the buyer,
who may tacitly agree to loot only from governmental programs
that do not benefit the vote sellers. These dangers are com-
pounded by the fact that the buyer needs to buy only votes among
those not otherwise committed to him; he does not have to make
the agreement with all his supporters, and may even end up cheat-
ing some of them.
Despite all this, it may be thought that there is some merit in
allowing political candidates to make public "tender offers" for
votes as a device for overcoming rational citizen apathy. A candi-
date could promise to pay cash to those who vote for him so long
as the offer is made available to all citizens eligible to vote in the
particular election, all who accept the offer are paid the same
amount per vote, and full disclosure is made concerning what the
politician plans to do in office. Whatever the worth of this sugges-
tion, the reasons for prohibiting outright vote buying in the politi-
cal arena do not apply to the corporate context since the corporate
and political environments are so significantly different.
Some minor arguments against equity-centered vote buying
and some additional general policy considerations remain to be
considered. First, it may be said that such vote buying, as exem-
plified by the tender offer for proxies, offends the notion of share-
holder democracy which calls for informed individual
decisionmaking and the best possible aggregation of shareholder
preferences,72 not decisions based on side payments. But, as Part I
was at pains to indicate, it is vain to expect that shareholders can
overcome rational apathy; only an alternative means for collective
action can obliterate its effect. In any event, since allowing tender
offers for proxies and other forms of vote buying would not in-
crease rational shareholder apathy, prohibiting vote buying would
not serve the purpose of one who desires more shareholder partici-
pation.
The second minor argument against equity-centered vote buy-
ing is based on the notion that if vote buying by insurgents is al-
72. For introductory treatments of these issues, see J. BUCHANAN & M. FLOWERS,
THE PUBLIC FINANCES 112-32 (4th ed. 1975); R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC
FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 102-26 (2d ed. 1976). See also K. ARRow, supra note
12, and J. BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 12.
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lowed, fairness requires that the target should also be permitted to
buy votes. The objection is that this system would open the way
to uncontrolled depletion of corporate assets at the instigation of
any determined insurgent. But the premise is wrong: fairness does
not require that incumbent managers be able to use the corporate
treasury for vote buying. As representatives of the company and
guardians of its interest, the incumbent managers have the right to
make reasonable proxy contest expenditures for the purpose of in-
forming the shareholders about the company's affairs, their own
performances, and their views about the inadequacies of the insur-
gent vote buyer and his plans for the company.73 As stockholders,
the managers may be interested in expending their own money to
secure proxies and protect their equity. If they are not willing to
match the insurgent's price for votes, an inference may be drawn
that they lack confidence in their ability to run the company in as
profitable a manner as the insurgent, or that they possess, as
shareholders, a lesser equity interest and therefore are less con-
cerned with the corporation's future earnings. Neither explana-
tion gives them a claim for protection against the insurgent.
Third, vote buying could conceivably lead to wasteful bidding
wars. But like competition among conventional tender offerors,
competition among vote buyers would result in the sellers' ob-
taining a better price. Since a single proxy cannot be given to
more than one of the opposing parties, the parties will not dupli-
cate each other's payments for proxies. A "war" may lead com-
peting vote buyers to incur greater transaction costs and, if the
protections against subsequent looting are strong enough, there
will be a natural limit to such expenditures. No vote buyer would
be willing to spend more on proxy payments and transaction costs
than the amount he expects to gain by his victory. He will also
limit his spending to account for the risk of losing the war.
III. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article is to attack the notion that when-
ever a person purchases voting rights in a corporation he should
also purchase the underlying equity interest. What has been de-
fined as equity-centered vote buying should be generally permit-
ted. Those objecting to such purchases should have the burden of
proving that the vote buying in question presents a clear, substan-
tial danger that the corporation or some of its shareholders will be
73. See E. ARANOW & H..EiNHoRN, supra note 7, at 547-49.
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unfairly treated if they wish to have the vote buying offer or agree-
ment declared invalid. The vote buyer should be able to defend
himself not only by rebutting the plaintiffs case, but also by rais-
ing and proving the affirmative defense that there is a reasonable
basis for believing that the vote buying will facilitate action that
will increase the corporation's value, and that this prospect out-
weighs any dangers suggested. A stated intention by the defend-
ant that he will not seek to establish a nonshareholder relationship
with the corporation other than a directorship should weigh heav-
ily in his favor. Further, the fact that the defendant attempted his
vote buying publicly and made his offer available to all sharehold-
ers on equal terms should be viewed favorably.
Perhaps the most important aspect of this exercise is the light it
casts on the role of corporate voting systems. They are valuable
despite the fact that participatory shareholder democracy is coma-
tose and has not responded to repeated attempts at resuscitation.
It is a better use of resources to attempt rejuvenation of the tech-
niques by which individual shareholders can be induced to act
decisively on behalf of the corporate collectivity. Within this large
endeavor, the encouragement of responsible vote buying is a wor-
thy project.
